In 1937 Tracy Sonneborn, a 32-year-old biologist at Johns Hopkins University, was working late into the night on an experiment involving the single-celled organism Paramecium. For years biologists had been trying to induce conjugation between paramecia, a process in which two paramecia exchange genetic material across a cytoplasmic bridge. Now Sonneborn had isolated two strains of paramecia that he believed would conjugate when combined. If successful, his experiment would finally overcome a major obstacle to studies of protozoan genetics.
Sonneborn mixed the strains together on a slide and put the slide under his microscope. Looking through the eyepiece, he witnessed for the first time what he would later call a "spectacular" reaction: The paramecia had clustered into large clumps and were conjugating. In a state of delirious excitement, Sonneborn raced through the halls of the deserted building looking for someone with whom he could share his joy. Finally he dragged a puzzled custodian back to the laboratory to peer through the microscope and witness this marvelous phenomenon. Moments of scientific discovery can be among the most exhilarating of a scientist's life. The desire to observe or understand what no one has ever observed or understood before is one of the forces that keep researchers rooted to their laboratory benches, climbing through the dense undergrowth of a sweltering jungle, or pursuing the threads of a difficult theoretical problem. Few discoveries seem to come in a flash; most materialize more slowly over weeks or years. Nevertheless, the process can bring great satisfaction. The pieces fit into place. The whole makes sense. A life in science can entail great frustrations and disappointments as well as satisfactions. An experiment can fail because of a technical complication or the sheer intractability of nature. A favorite hypothesis that has consumed months of effort can turn out to be incorrect. Disputes can break out with colleagues over the validity of experimental data, the interpretation of data, or credit for work done. Setbacks such as these are virtually impossible to avoid in science, and they can strain the composure of both the novice and the most self-assured senior scientist. To an observer of science, the presence of these human elements in research raises an obvious question. Science results in knowledge that is as solid and reliable as anything we know. Science and technology are among humanity's greatest achievements, having transformed not only the material conditions of our lives but the very way in which we view the world. Yet scientific knowledge emerges from a process that is intensely human, a process marked by its full share of human virtues and limitations. How is the limited, fallible work of individual scientists converted into the enduring edifice of scientific knowledge? Many people think of scientific research as a routine, cut-and-dried process. They associate the nature of scientific knowledge with the process of deriving it and conclude that research is as objective and unambiguous as scientific results. The reality is much different. Researchers continually have to make difficult decisions about how to do their work and how to present that work to others. Scientists have a large body of knowledge that they can use in making these decisions. Yet much of this knowledge is not the product of scientific investigation, but instead involves value-laden judgments, personal desires, and even a researcher's personality and style.
This booklet divides the decisions that scientists make into two overlapping categories. Much of the first half of the booklet looks at several examples of the choices that scientists make in their work as individuals: the treatment of data, techniques used to minimize bias, the application of values in judging hypotheses. The second half deals largely with questions that arise during the interactions among scientists: the need to report research results honestly and accurately, the proper distribution of credit for scientific work, the difficult problem of reporting misconduct. A final section touches upon the social context in which personal and professional decisions are made and details a few of the special obligations that scientists have as members of society at large.
Report
The nature of scientific research T hroughout the history of science, some philosophers and scientists have sought to describe a single systematic method that can be used to generate scientific knowledge. For instance, one school of thought, dating back at least to Francis Bacon in the seventeenth century, points to observations as the fundamental source of scientific knowledge. According to this view, scientists must cleanse their minds of preconceptions, sitting down before nature "as a little child," as the nineteenth-century biologist Thomas H. Huxley described it. By gathering facts without prejudice, a scientist will eventually arrive at the correct theory. Some scientists may believe in such a picture of themselves and their work, but carrying this approach into practice is impossible. Nature is too amorphous and diverse for human beings to observe without having some ideas about what they are observing. Scientific understanding is made possible through the interplay of mental constructs and sensory impressions. Scientists may be able to suspend some prior theoretical or thematic preconceptions to view nature from a new perspective, but they cannot view the physical world without any perspective.
Other Millikan has been criticized for not disclosing which data he omitted or why he omitted those data. But an examination of his notebooks reveals that Millikan felt he knew just how far he could trust his raw data. He often jotted down in his notebooks what he thought were good reasons for excluding data. However, he glossed over these exclusions in some of his published papers, and by present standards this is not acceptable. Scientists must be willing to acknowledge the limitations on their data if they are not to mislead others about the data's reliability.
General rules for distinguishing a priori "good" data from "bad" cannot be formulated with much clarity. Nevertheless, good scientists have methods that they can apply in judging the reliability of data, and learning these methods is one of the goals of a scientific apprenticeship. These methods may be unique to a given situation, depending on how and why a set of observations is being made. Nevertheless, they impose constraints on how those observations can be interpreted. A researcher is not free to select only the data that fit his or her prior expectations. If certain data are excluded, a researcher must have justifiable reasons for doing so.
The Relation Between Hypotheses and Observations
Attempts to isolate the facts and nothing but the facts in scientific research can raise philosophical as well as methodological problems. One prominent difficulty involves the line of demarcation between hypotheses and observations. For years philosophers have tried to construct purely observational languages free of theoretical constructs, but they have never been completely successful. Even a simple description such as "The temperature in this room is 25 degrees centigrade" contains a host of theoretical underpinnings. The thermometer used to measure the temperature is a complex device subject to its own systematic and random errors. And the quantity being measured is not some fundamental attribute of nature but depends in a complex way on the movements and interactions of gas particles, which are described in terms of the kinetic theory of gases, quantum mechanics, and so on. The terms used in science also contribute to the interpenetration of hypotheses and observations. For example, Anton van Leeuwenhoek, the seventeenth-century Dutch microscopist, prided himself in describing what he saw through his lenses without any theoretical speculation. However, his descriptions were anything but theoryneutral. When he examined the water standing in the gutter outside his window, some of the microscopic creatures he saw were probably Euglena. Today we know that these single-celled organisms contain chlorophyll and are more closely related to plants than animals. But because the creatures moved, van Leeuwenhoek called them "animalcules," not "planticules."
Terms such as "energy," "gross national product," "pion," "black hole," "intelligence quotient," and "gene" are clearly derived from particular theories and obtain much of their meaning from their roles in these theories. But 
Judging Hypotheses
Values emerge into particularly sharp relief when a longestablished theory comes into conflict with new observations. Individual responses to such situations range between two extremes. At one end of the spectrum is the notion that a theory must be rejected or extensively modified as soon as one of its predictions is not borne out by an experiment. However, history is full of examples in which this would have been premature because not enough was known to make an accurate prediction. A classic ex-N RAYS Self-delusion is not a danger only for individual scientists. Sometimes a number of scientists can get caught up in scientific pursuits that later prove to be unfounded. One of the most famous examples of such "pathological science" is the history of N rays. In the first few years of the twentieth century, shortly after the discovery of X rays by the German physicist Wilhelm Roentgen, the distinguished French physicist Rene Blondlot announced that he had discovered a new type of radiation. Blondlot named the new radiation N rays after the University of Nancy, where he was professor of physics. The rays were supposedly produced by a variety of sources, including electrical discharges within gases and heated pieces of metal; they could be refracted through aluminum prisms; and they could be detected by observing faint visual effects where the rays hit phosphorescent or photographic surfaces. Within a few years, dozens of papers describing the properties of N rays had been published in journals by eminent scientists.
Other scientists, however, found it impossible to duplicate the experiments. One such scientist was the American physicist Robert W. Wood, who traveled to Blondlot's laboratory in 1904 to witness the experiments for himself. After viewing several inconclusive experiments, Wood was shown an experiment by Blondlot in which N rays generated by a lamp were bent through an aluminum prism and fell on a phosphorescent detector. At one point in the experiment, Wood took advantage of the room's darkness to surreptitiously remove the aluminum prism from the apparatus. Nevertheless, Blondlot continued to detect the visual signals that he believed were caused by N rays.
In an article in Nature published shortly after his visit, Wood wrote that he was "unable to report a single observation which appeared to indicate the existence of the rays." Scientific work on N rays soon collapsed, and previous results were shown to be experimental artifacts or the result of observer effects. Yet Blondlot continued to believe in the existence of N rays until his death in 1930. 
Replication and the Openness of Communication
The requirement that results be validated by one's peers explains why scientific papers must be written in such a way that the observations in them can be replicated. However, actual replication in science is selective: it tends to be reserved for experiments with unusual importance or for experiments that conflict with an accepted body of work. Most often, scientists who hear or read about a result that affects their own research build on that result. If something goes wrong with the subsequent work, researchers may then return to the original results and attempt to duplicate them.
Scientists build on previous results because it is not practical (or necessary) to reconstruct all the observations and theoretical constructs that go into an investigation. They make the operating assumption that previous investigators performed work as reported and adhered to the methods prescribed by the community. If that trust is misplaced and the previous results are inaccurate, the truth will likely emerge as problems arise in the ongoing investigation. But months or years of effort may be wasted in the process. Thus, the social structure of science minimizes errors in the long run through peer Because of the limits on verification, philosophers have suggested that a much stronger logical constraint on scientific theories is that they be falsifiable. In other words, theories must have the possibility of being proved wrong, because then they can be meaningfully tested against observation. This criterion of falsifiability is one way to distinguish scientific from nonscientific claims. In this light, the claims of astrologers or creationists cannot be scientific because these groups will not admit that their ideas can be falsified.
Falsifiability is a stronger logical constraint than verifiability, but the basic problem remains. 
THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF PRIORITY
The system of associating scientific priority with publication took shape during the seventeenth century in the early years of modern science. Even then, a tension existed between the need of scientists to have access to other findings and a desire to keep work secret so that others would not claim it as their own. Scientists of the time, including Isaac Newton, were loathe to convey news of their discoveries to scientific societies for fear that someone else would claim priority, a fear that was frequently realized.
To ensure priority, many scientists, including Galileo, Huygens, and Newton, resorted to constructing anagrams describing their discoveries that they would then make known to others. For instance, the law "mass times acceleration equals force" could be disguised as "a remote, facile question scares clams" (though Newton would have constructed his anagrams in Latin). Later, if someone else came up with the same discovery, the original discoverer could unscramble the anagram to establish priority. However, other scientists were having trouble replicating Summerlin's work. Another immunologist at Sloan-Kettering was assigned to repeat some of Summerlin's experiments, but he, too, could not make the experiments work. As doubts were growing, Summerlin began a series of experiments in which he grafted patches of skin from black mice onto white mice. One morning as Summerlin was carrying some of the white mice to the director of the institute to demonstrate his progress, he took a felt-tipped pen from his pocket and darkened some of the black skin grafts on two white mice. After the meeting, a laboratory assistant noticed that the dark color could be washed away with alcohol, and within a few hours the director knew of the incident. Summerlin subsequently admitted his deception to the director and to others. Summerlin was suspended from his duties and a six-member committee conducted a review of the veracity of his scientific work and his alleged misrepresentations concerning that work. In particular, in addition to reviewing the "mouse incident," the committee examined a series of experiments in which Summerlin and several collaborators had transplanted parts of corneas into the eyes of rabbits. The committee found that Summerlin had incorrectly and repeatedly exhibited or reported on certain rabbits as each having had two human corneal transplants, one unsuccessful from a fresh cornea and the other successful from a cultured cornea. In fact, only one cornea had been transplanted to each rabbit, and all were unsuccessful.
When asked to explain this serious discrepancy, Summerlin stated that he believed that the protocol called for each rabbit to receive a fresh cornea in one eye and a cultured cornea in the other eye. Summerlin subsequently admitted that he did not know and was not in a position to know which rabbits had undergone this protocol, and that he only assumed what procedures had been carried out on the rabbits he exhibited. After reviewing the circumstances of what the investigating committee characterized as "this grossly misleading assumption," the report of the investigating committee stated: "The only possible conclusion is that Dr. Summerlin was responsible for initiating and perpetuating a profound and serious misrepresentation about the results of transplanting cultured human corneas to rabbits."
The investigating committee concluded that "some actions of Dr. Summerlin over a considerable period of time were not those of a responsible scientist." There were indications that Summerlin may have been suffering from emotional illness, and the committee's report recommended "that Dr. Summerlin be offered a medical leave of absence, to alleviate his situation, which may have been exacerbated by pressure of the many obligations which he voluntarily undertook." The report also stated that, "for whatever reason," Dr. Summerlin's behavior represented "irresponsible conduct that was incompatible with discharge of his responsibilities in the scientific community." 9068 Report "We thus begin to see that the institutionalized practice ofcitations and references in the sphere oflearning is not a trivial matter While many a general reader-that is, the lay reader located outside the domain ofscience and scholarship-may regard the lowlyfootnote or the remote endnote or the bibliographic parenthesis as a dispensable nuisance, it can be argued that these are in truth central to the incentive system and an underlying sense ofdistributive justice that do much to energize the advancement ofknowledge. " more deplorable than cooking or trimming data, all three are intentionally misleading and deceptive.
Instances of scientific fraud have received a great deal of public attention in recent years, which may have exaggerated perceptions of its apparent frequency. Over the past few decades, several dozen cases of fraud have come to light in science. These cases represent a tiny fraction of the total output of the large and expanding research community. Of course, instances of scientific fraud may go undetected, or detected cases of fraud may be handled privately within research institutions. But there is a good reason for believing the incidence of fraud in science to be quite low. Because science is a cumulative enterprise, in which investigators test and build on the work of their predecessors, fraudulent observations and hypotheses tend eventually to be uncovered. Science could not be the successful institution it is if fraud were common. The social mechanisms of science, and in particular the skeptical review and verification of published work, act to minimize the occurrence of fraud.
The Allocation of Credit
Fraud may be the gravest sin in science, but transgressions that involve the allocation of credit and responsibility also distort the internal workings of the profession. In the standard scientific paper, credit is explicitly acknowledged in two places: at the beginning in the list of authors, and at the end in the list of references or citations (sometimes accompanied by acknowledgments). Conflicts over proper attribution can arise in both places.
Citations serve a number of purposes in a scientific paper. They acknowledge the work of other scientists, direct the reader toward additional sources of information, acknowledge conflicts with other results, and provide support for the views expressed in the paper. More broadly, citations place a paper within its scientificcontext, relating it to the present state of scientific knowledge.
PATENT PROCEDURES
In some areas of research, a scientist may make a discovery that has commercial potential. Patenting is a means of protecting that potential while continuing to disseminate the results of the research.
Patent applications involve such issues as ownership, inventorship, and licensing policies. In many situations, ownership of a patent is assigned to an institution, whether a university, a company, or a governmental organization. Some institutions share royalty income with the inventors. Universities and government laboratories usually have a policy of licensing inventions in a manner consistent with the public interest, at least in cases in which federal funds have supported the research.
Scientists who may be doing patentable work have an obligation to themselves and to their employers to safeguard intellectual property rights. Particularly in industry or in a national laboratory, this may involve prompt disclosure of a valuable discovery to the patent official of the organization in which the scientist works. It also entails keeping accurately dated notebook records written in ink in a bound notebook, ideally witnessed and signed by a colleague who is not a coinventor. Data One potential problem area in collaborative research involves the listing of a paper's authors. In many fields the earlier a name appears in the list of authors the greater the implied contribution, but conventions differ greatly among disciplines and among research groups. Sometimes the scientist with the greatest name recognition is listed first, whereas in other fields the research leader's name is always last. In some disciplines, supervisors' names rarely appear on papers, while in others the professor's name appears on almost every paper that comes out of the lab. Well-established scientists may decide to list their names after those of more junior colleagues, reasoning that the younger scientists thereby receive a greater boost in reputation than they would if the order were reversed. Some research groups and journals avoid these decisions by simply listing authors alphabetically.
Frank and open discussion of the division of credit within research groups, as early in the process leading to a published paper as possible, can avoid later difficulties. Collaborators must also have a thorough understanding of the conventions in a particular field to know if they are being treated fairly.
Occasionally a name is included in a list of authors even though that person had little or nothing to do with the genesis or completion of the paper. Such "honorary authors" dilute the credit due the people who actually did the work and make the proper attribution of credit more difficult. Some scientific journals now state that a person should be listed as the author of a paper only if that person made a direct and substantial contribution to the paper. Of course, such terms as "direct" and "substantial" are themselves open to interpretation. But such statements of principle help change customary practices, which is the only lasting way to discourage the practice of honorary authorships.
As with citations, author listings establish responsibility as well as credit. When a paper is shown to contain error, whether caused by mistakes or fraud, authors might wish to disavow responsibility, saying that they were not involved in the part of the paper containing the errors or that they had very little to do with the paper in general. However, an author who is willing to take credit for a paper must also bear responsibility for its contents. Thus, unless responsibility is apportioned explicitly in a footnote or in the body of the paper, the authors whose names appear on a paper must be willing to share responsibility for all of it. Perhaps the most disturbing situation that a researcher can encounter is to witness some act of scientific misconduct by a colleague. In such a case, researchers have a professional and ethical obligation to do something about it. On pragmatic grounds, the transgression may seem too distant from one's own work to take action. But assaults on the integrity of science damage all scientists, both through the effects of those assaults on the public's impression of science and through the internal erosion of scientific norms.
To be sure, "whistle-blowing" is rarely an easy route. Fulfilling the responsibilities to oneself discussed earlier in this booklet will not harm a person's career. That has not necessarily been the case with whistle-blowing. Responses by the accused person and by skeptical colleagues that cast the accuser's integrity into doubt have been all too common, though institutions have been adopting policies to minimize such reprisals.
Accusing another scientist of wrongdoing is a very serious charge that can be costly, emotionally traumatizing, and professionally damaging even if no transgression occurred. A person making such a charge should therefore be extremely careful that the claim is justified. One of the best ways to judge one's own motives and the accuracy of a charge is to discuss the situation confidentially with a trusted, experienced colleague. Many universities and other institutions have designated particular individuals to be the points of initial contact in such disputes. Institutions have also prepared written materials that offer guidance in situations involving professional ethics. In addition, Sigma Xi, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and other scientific and engineering organizations are prepared to advise scientists who encounter cases of possible misconduct.
Once sure of the facts, the person suspected of misconduct should be contacted privately and given a chance to explain or rectify the situation. Many problems can be solved in this fashion without involving a larger forum. If these steps do not lead to a satisfactory resolution or if the case involves serious forms of misconduct, more formal proceedings will have to be initiated. For this purpose, most research institutions have developed procedures that take into account fairness for the accused, protection for the accuser, coordination with funding agencies, and requirements for confidentiality and disclosure.
Assaults on the integrity of science come from outside science as well as from within. Vocal minorities that call
The scientist in society his discussion has concentrated on the responsibilities of scientists to themselves and their colleagues, but scientists have obligations to the broader society as well. These obligations are most apparent when scientific research intersects directly with broader societal concerns, as in the protection of the environment, the humane treatment of laboratory animals, or the inforned consent of human experimental subjects. Such obligations are also common in applied research, in which the products of scientific investigation can have a direct and immediate impact on people's lives.
Scientists conducting basic research also need to be aware that their work ultimately may have a great impact on society. World-changing discoveries can emerge from seemingly arcane areas of science. The construction of the atomic bomb and the development of recombinant DNA, events that grew out of research into the nucleus of the atom and investigations of certain bacterial enzymes, respectively, are two examples. The occurrence and consequences of discoveries in basic research are virtually impossible to foresee. Nevertheless, the scientific community must recognize the potential for such discoveries and be prepared to address the questions that they raise. The response of biologists to the development of recombinant DNA-first calling for a temporary moratorium on the research and then setting up a regulatory mechanism to ensure its safety-is an excellent example of researchers exercising these responsibilities.
This document cannot hope to describe the diverse responsibilities-and associated opportunities-that scientists encounter as members of society. The bibliography lists several volumes that examine the social roles of scientists in detail. The 
